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Does self-prioritisation affect perceptual processes? 
The tendency to prioritise information related to the self (or socially salient 
information) has been established for several cognitive tasks. However, earlier 
studies on this question suffered from confounds such as familiarity and 
intimacy. Recently, a series of studies (e.g. Sui, He and Humphreys, 2012) 
overcame this limitation using newly learnt associations between geometric 
shapes and identities. Results from these studies have been argued to show that 
self-prioritisation affects perceptual processing. In two studies, we replicated 
and extended the paradigm introduced by Sui et al. to test an alternative 
hypothesis that self-prioritisation does not affect perceptual processes but 
arises from potential memory differences introduced during the formation of 
associations. We found that induced memory differences lead to response 
patterns similar to those that have been attributed to changes in the perceptual 
domain. However, even extended learning undertaken to equate memory for 
various identity-based associations did not eliminate the effects of self-
prioritisation, leaving the question open if the differences are cognitive or 
perceptual in nature. The current evidence can be explained both in terms of 
memory differences and perceptual effects. Hence, we strongly recommend 
that the existence of perceptual effects of self-prioritisation should be 
investigated directly rather than through changes in reaction times in match-
non-match tasks. 
Keywords: associative learning; self-reference; self-prioritisation; memory; 
perception 
 
Introduction 
We are confronted on a daily basis with more information than can be processed. How 
we cope with this flood of information has been studied for at least 50 years (Carrasco, 
2011; Cherry, 1953; Maunsell, 2015; Moray, 1959). One criterion that is likely to 
influence the selection and processing of information is its relation to the self. 
Information that is related or that has been considered in relation to the self seems to 
be preferentially processed relative to any other information. Interestingly, such 
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references to the self have been shown to influence several cognitive mechanisms. That 
is, self-reference has been argued to guide attention (e.g. Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959; 
Wood & Cowan, 1995), influence perception (e.g. Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Sui, Liu, 
Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2015), modulate preference (Debevec & Romeo, 1992; Koole, 
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; Nuttin, 1985) and enhance memory (e.g. Bower 
& Gilligan, 1979; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008). 
Specifically, attention has been shown to be captured quickly and automatically 
by stimuli related to the self (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012) even when it 
is disadvantageous (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bargh, 1982; Brédart, Delchambre, & 
Laureys, 2006; Wolford & Morrison, 1980 but see Devue & Brédart, 2008). Early studies 
investigating the effect of self-related information, also referred to as social salience, 
used established self-associations like the participants’ own names as stimuli. A famous 
example for self-reference guided selective attention is the cocktail party problem. 
Cherry (1953) and other researchers who conducted similar studies (e.g. Moray, 1959; 
Wood & Cowan, 1995) found that, in a noisy environment (e.g. a party), we can follow 
one conversation by ignoring all other conversations to the point where we cannot recall 
anything that was mentioned in these ignored conversations. Yet when our name is 
mentioned in such an ignored conversation, our attention is automatically diverted to 
the source (Moray, 1959), and remains there for a short period of time (Wood & Cowan, 
1995). This ongoing monitoring of the ignored ‘channels’ has been considered useful, as 
information presented after self-referential information is likely to be of importance to 
oneself (Wood & Cowan, 1995). However, one’s own name is not the only form of self-
referential information that has been shown to capture attention. In a study using 
descriptive attributes (e.g. independent, arrogant, ambitious), participants’ attention 
was shown to be drawn to these attributes only for participants that had previously 
reported that they apply to them (Bargh, 1982).  
As noted above, these social psychological studies are based on self-associations 
that have been learnt over a lifetime (e.g. one’s own name). Such stimuli have the 
obvious confound that they are over-learnt and hence any effects they produce might 
be attributed to familiarity and the extent of learning rather than associations with the 
self. More recently, therefore, effects of social salience have been explored using newly 
formed associations between stimuli and the self (Sui et al., 2012). For example, in the 
study by Sui and colleagues, participants were asked to quickly form associations 
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between simple geometric shapes (e.g. circle, triangle, square) and different identities 
(e.g. themselves, their best friend, a stranger). Here, participants were verbally 
instructed that, for example, “a stranger is a circle, Katrin [the participant's best friend] 
is a triangle and you are a square”. These new associations were then tested in a match-
non-match task, where participants were presented with either pairings that matched 
the instructions (e.g. you-square) or pairings that did not match the instructions (e.g. 
stranger-triangle). Using this paradigm, the researchers found faster and more accurate 
responses for the self-associated shape than for pairings between others and shapes. 
Further, they found that a reduction in luminance contrast of the shapes had less 
influence on task performance when the presented shape was related to the self, than 
when the shapes were related to others. They concluded that self-reference influences 
the perceptual processing of stimuli associated with the self. This study also suggests 
that new shape-identity associations can be established quickly and are therefore an 
efficient way to study effects of self-reference, while ruling out familiarity as a factor.  
Further evidence that newly established associations with the self can influence 
perception comes from a follow-up study using shape-identity associations in a global-
local task (Sui et al., 2015). A global-local task involves stimuli that have two levels: a 
global shape (say a triangle) made up of local shapes (in congruent trials the strokes of 
the global shape would be made up of several smaller triangles and in incongruent trials 
it would be made up of some other shape, such as several smaller circles); participants 
in this experiment are asked to quickly name either the global shape (“triangle”) or the 
local shape (“circle”). In such a task, the shape associated with the self interfered with 
shape naming in incongruent trials. For example, if the self-related shape was presented 
at the local level, it would interfere with the naming of the global level shape, and vice 
versa. However, the shapes associated with others did not influence shape naming 
performance. It was argued that the self-related shape yielded response patterns similar 
to an object with higher physical salience. This suggests that social salience can influence 
attention in a way similar to physical salience and that newly established self-referential 
stimuli are able to grab attention as well as established ones do.  
However, some recent experiments have failed to find an effect of self-reference 
on the perceptual system. For example, Siebold, Weaver, Donk, & van Zoest, 2015 used 
a similar associative learning paradigm in several oculomotor visual search tasks. Here, 
associations were formed between the self, a stranger and two orthogonally tilted lines 
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(45o left and right). Participants were asked to make an eye movement to one of two 
tilted lines, which were presented in opposite hemi-fields at about 8° eccentricity, 
embedded in a grid of vertical lines. In this paradigm, differences in eye movement 
latencies would indicate that self-reference can influence overt attention. However, no 
such effect of self-reference was found in the visual search task. Nevertheless, the study 
was able to replicate the original findings of Sui et al. (2012), finding shorter reaction 
times for the self-related line in a match-non-match task. These findings suggest that 
self-reference does not affect voluntary overt visual selection, even if it affects 
responses in a match-non-match task.  
Additionally, it has been well established that associations with the self not only 
influence attention but also affect memory. What has been termed the self-reference 
effect (SRE) is the facilitation of memory for nouns, traits and incidents that have been 
related to the self compared to those that were not considered in relation to the self 
(e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Rogers et al., 1977; Turk et al., 2008). In studies 
investigating the SRE, memory is usually tested in a surprise recall task at the end of a 
range of judgment tasks (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Rogers et al. (1977) compared 
memory for trait words when participants judged their relatedness to the self versus 
when they judged aspects of the word's appearance (i.e. “were the letters 
capitalised?”), phonetics, semantics and meaning, and found that more trait words were 
recalled when the task was to judge their relation to the self than for any of the other 
judgments. In a meta-analysis of 129 studies, Symons and Johnson (1997) identified 
factors that influence the size of the SRE. They found that the SRE was more pronounced 
when self-reference was compared to semantic encoding, than when it was compared 
to encoding the relation to another person (e.g. Does the attribute describe your 
mother?). Further, when comparing self-reference with reference to another person, 
intimacy (not familiarity) was shown to modulate the size of the SRE. That is, the more 
intimate the relationship to the other person the smaller the benefit for self-reference 
in memory.  
Most of these findings come from studies where self-reference is used explicitly 
in judgment tasks. Although people might be using self-reference actively as a technique 
to form memories, self-reference might also be able to influence memory 
unintentionally. Turk et al. (2008) compared the influence of self-reference when 
reference to the self was made explicit compared to when it was implicit. Following 
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either a self-referential stimulus (e.g. own face or name) or non-self-referential stimulus 
(e.g. face or name of a gender-matched celebrity), participants were shown trait 
adjectives and either asked to judge if the traits describe the person shown before 
(explicit) or if the trait adjective was presented above or below the fixation mark 
(implicit). In a surprise memory task, memory was found to be better for attributes 
presented following the self-related stimulus compared to the other-related stimulus, 
and better when traits were judged in relation to the person compared to its position. 
Although the memory effect was bigger in the explicit judgment task, it was shown that 
memory can also be automatically influenced by self-reference. That is, presenting a 
stimulus in close proximity with self-referential information seems to be enough to 
make it more memorable than when it is presented alongside other-referential 
information. 
A number of theories have been brought forward to explain how considering 
information in relation to the self might facilitate memory for this information. Of 
particular importance are four proposals: depth of processing, elaboration, connectivity 
and organisation. 1) According to the depth of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972), evaluating the physical appearance of a descriptive attribute word (e.g. 
‘confident’) leads to shallow processing of the word and hence to a weaker memory 
trace than when evaluating if the attribute is descriptive of one’s personality (deeper 
processing) (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979). 2) Similarly, elaboration is thought to facilitate 
memory (Craik & Tulving, 1975; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979) and self-reference might lead 
to increased elaboration. For example, when asked to judge if an attribute is descriptive 
of oneself, we might consider the self in a range of situations to reach a conclusion, 
whereas when asked if the first letter of the attribute is a ‘c’ we are unlikely to consider 
anything but the first letter of the word. This difference in elaboration leads to 
substantial differences in memory for such words. 3) The self as a memory construct can 
be involved in a large number of possible connections, based on the large amount of 
pre-existing information already connected to it (Ingram, Smith, & Brehm, 1983; Keenan 
& Baillet, 1980; Markus, 1977). Strength of connectivity can lead to improved memory 
for such words. 4) Facilitation effects based on self-reference can also be attributed to 
better organisation of information. That is, when evaluating if attributes are descriptive 
of oneself, they will likely be organised into those that are and those that aren’t and 
therefore can be better recalled (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). Therefore, self-referencing 
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likely leads to deeper processing of stimuli, with increased elaboration, increased 
conceptual connectivity and better structured information, thereby leading to more 
stable memory traces (Kihlstrom, 1993; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
It is clear that the evidence, outlined above, suggests that both attention and 
memory are influenced by self-reference or self-prioritisation, even with novel self-
associations (perhaps with the exception of overt attention; Siebold et al., 2015). This 
should not come as a surprise considering that attentional and memory processes are 
closely intertwined (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 
1984). With attention working as a gatekeeper for memory, self-prioritisation is likely to 
influence the probability of memory formation in addition to the above-mentioned 
factors that modulate memory encoding and consolidation. Therefore, self-association 
could lead to increased engagement of attention compared to other-association or 
evaluating an item’s semantics. This in turn might increase the likelihood with which this 
attribute is made available to memory and thereby the likelihood with which it is later 
recalled. However, the interaction between attention and memory is not a one-way 
street; attention can also be influenced by memory. When activated (e.g. through an 
associated retrieval cue), information that is stored in long-term memory is made 
temporarily available to working memory (Baddeley, 2000; Cantor & Engle, 1993; 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2003). For items as 
different as faces (Downing, 2000) and colour and shape singletons (Olivers, Meijer, & 
Theeuwes, 2006; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; but see Woodman & Luck, 
2007), it has been shown that actively holding them in working memory can capture 
attention. This was shown to be the case for both visually and verbally presented items 
(Soto & Humphreys, 2007). This suggests that when investigating the effect of self-
reference, attention might be drawn to a stimulus not because of its relation to the self, 
but because it is more active or stable in memory. We plan to test this possibility in the 
current study.  
Furthermore, when attention is assessed in terms of reaction times, differences 
can arise from differences in the certainty with which a response is made. Reaction times 
were shown to be faster when memory was more stable (Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & 
Dean, 2006). Therefore, differences in reaction times could be incorrectly attributed to 
changes in attention allocation to or perceptual salience of self-referential stimuli when 
they in fact originate from differences in memory based certainty and accuracy. 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that three shape-identity pairs can be learnt quickly. From 
this it has been implicitly inferred that memory processes are the same for all pairings 
(such as those in the Sui et al. studies). Hence reaction time differences have been 
ascribed to attentional and/or perceptual processing. However, introducing time 
pressure by terminating trials after a short response period can also reveal differences 
in the stability of the formed associations that might otherwise not be obvious, 
producing the same results. 
Due to the close relationship between attention and memory the effect of self-
reference might not be attributable exclusively to one or the other, and could even be 
based on an interaction between attention and memory. Therefore, when trying to 
disentangle the effects of self-reference on attention and on memory, one of them has 
to be carefully controlled while the other is studied. It is hard to control for these 
differences using established referential stimuli like one’s own or others’ names and 
faces. Even when the stimuli representing the other are chosen to be well known, they 
are still likely to be less familiar (e.g. own face compared to that of a celebrity). Using 
newly established stimulus-identity references can overcome this problem. However, 
since the associations between stimuli and identities need to be learnt first, these 
associations are also susceptible to differences in memory processes when they are not 
controlled for. As is evident from the literature on the SRE for memory, relating 
something to the self leads to a more stable memory representation than when relating 
it to others (Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
The associative learning procedure typically used in such studies (e.g. Siebold et 
al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012) relies on the fact that participants can learn the associations 
between shapes and identities rapidly by listening to a statement (once or a few times 
at most) about their connections. Here, the associated shapes and identities are usually 
presented aurally (e.g. the sentence “Kevin [the participant's best friend] is a square, 
you are a triangle and a stranger is a circle” is uttered through a headphone). In such a 
situation, given the well-documented SRE advantage in memory processes, it is possible 
that self-related associations are represented in a stronger and more stable manner 
than are non-self-related associations, leading to poor performance on non-self-related 
trials in subsequent tasks. In this reading, the perceptual and attentional systems do not 
differentially process the subsequently presented pairings, but it is the differences in the 
stability of their memory, or in other words the strength of the shape-identity binding, 
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that translates to the observed behavioural differences. This explanation can also 
account for the so-called perceptual effects of the self on behaviour, such as the lack of 
reduction in performance for self-associations when stimuli have lower luminance 
contrast (Sui et al., 2012). Here, it is possible that the self-association is strong and hence 
leads to quicker and more accurate responses, even when the stimulus itself is weakly 
perceived, whereas the other representations are weakly represented and cannot drive 
high performance even at higher contrasts. Thus, the results do not unambiguously 
suggest that self-related stimuli are perceived or attended differently than non-self-
related stimuli (e.g. a low contrast self-stimulus is not perceived as having higher 
contrast). The results could be attributed to memory differences. Similarly, the 
interference induced by self-associated shapes in the Global-Local task (Sui et al., 2015) 
can also be explained as due to stronger representations for self-associations, which can 
influence responses, and not necessarily due to perceptual differences. Therefore, in the 
studies using such short and uncontrolled associative learning paradigms, it is unclear 
whether the results are driven by perceptual or memory differences. 
The current study was designed to test the hypothesis that the observed 
performance differences as a function of the kind of associations made with novel 
stimuli were due to differences in the strength of memory representations for the newly 
formed associations rather than perceptual or attentional effects. In two experiments, 
we hoped to disentangle the effect self-association has on attention and on memory. In 
experiment 1, we used the original associative learning paradigm introduced by Sui et 
al. (2012, experiment 1) and attempted to replicate their findings. Additionally, we 
introduced an extended learning paradigm. In this paradigm, participants were not only 
told which shapes represented which identities, but they also practiced on these 
associations until they reached error-free performance. This should eliminate any 
memory based differences among all shape-label pairings; we then tested if the effects 
of self-reference remained when possible differences in memory were controlled for. 
The second experiment approached the same question from the opposite direction: it 
was designed to test if differences observed by Siebold et al. (2015) and Sui et al. (2012) 
could be produced when differences in memory were artificially induced, even without 
any involvement of the self. Here, associations were formed between shapes and 
meaningless word-like non-words. Exposure to these associations during learning was 
manipulated to explicitly produce differences in memory representations. That is, we 
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sought to introduce a difference in memory between the different shape-non-word-
association by manipulating the frequency with which a shape-non-word pair was 
presented during training. We then tested if the behavioural performance resulting from 
such memory differences matched those ascribed to perceptual effects in the literature. 
If it is the case that the effect of self-prioritisation is based on differences in memory, 
and is not due to changes in the perceptual domain, we would expect that extended 
associative learning will eliminate the effect of self-prioritisation. Further, introducing 
memory differences for non-identity related information should evoke response 
patterns that resemble those of self-prioritisation. These findings should allow us to 
arbitrate the debate between perceptual and cognitive origins of the self-prioritisation 
effect. 
Methods: Experiment 1 
This experiment pursued two goals. First, it attempted to replicate the findings of Sui et 
al. (2012). Second, it tested an alternative explanation for the effect of self-prioritisation 
in match-non-match tasks. Towards these ends, we implemented the same paradigm as 
Sui et al. (2012) and added two further conditions that investigated the role of memory 
in the reported self-reference effects. In the latter conditions, we eliminated potential 
differences in memory across different shape-identity associations using extended 
associative learning; we then tested if the advantage for self-related associations over 
non-self-related associations in terms of reaction times and accuracy persisted. 
Participants 
72 participants (24 per learning-condition, 51 female, 22.2 ± 4.8 years) were recruited 
from the student population at the University of Aberdeen. They were compensated for 
their participation with either course credit (year 1 and 2 Psychology undergraduate 
students) or £5 (all other students). Participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. Participants who had previously taken part in experiments where they were 
asked to form associations between shapes and identities were excluded from the 
study. Informed written consent was obtained. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the University of Aberdeen.  
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The number of participants was based on power analysis conducted for the main 
effect of association type (e.g. to self, friend or other) in a within-subjects design using 
the G*Power3 application (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The effect size used 
for this calculation was the smallest reported effect size (𝜂𝜂2 =   0.41) in Sui et al. (2012) 
for the comparison of interest (Experiments 1 and 2a). For a recommended power of 
0.95 (Open Science Collaboration, 2012), 14 participants were considered necessary to 
uncover an effect at an α-level of 0.05 and 19 participants at an α-level of 0.01. We 
recruited 24 in order to allow for complete counterbalancing. 
Material and Stimuli 
The visual stimuli were designed to match those described by Sui et al. (2012) and were 
generated in MATLAB using Psychophysics toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner 
et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). All stimuli were displayed in black on a white background on a 
19-inch Dell TFT Screen (1280x1024, 60Hz). Viewing distance was approximately 57 cm. 
Three identity words (‘you’, ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’), three geometric shapes 
(circle, triangle and square), and three geometric labels (the words ‘circle’, ‘triangle’, 
and ‘square’) were used as stimuli in an associative learning task and in a match non-
match task. Line drawings of geometric shapes had a size of approximately 3.8 x 3.8 
degrees. Words were presented in Geneva font and had a height of approximately 1.6 
degrees. Participants wore headphones to receive auditory instructions and feedback. 
All spoken instructions were generated using a computer voice. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two tasks: an associative learning task and a match non-
match judgement task.  
Associative learning task 
To learn associations between shapes and identities, all participants were told which 
identity was represented by which shape. For example, a participant was told: “you are 
a circle, Kevin [the participant's best friend], your friend, is a square, and a stranger is a 
triangle”. This association was learnt by the participant in one of three ways: 
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(1) Standard learning procedure (as used by Sui et al., 2012): participants were given 
verbal instructions indicating which identity was represented by which shape. 
They received this instruction once via the headphone.  
(2) Shape-identity learning procedure: After receiving verbal instructions, as in the 
standard learning procedure, participants performed an extended shape-
identity matching. This learning took place over multiple blocks of 6 trials each. 
In half the trials (3 trials) a shape was presented and the participant was asked 
to pick its identity among all three options using a mouse. In the other half 
(remaining 3 trials) an identity word was presented and the participant was 
asked to pick the appropriate shape. All shapes and identities were tested within 
a block. We describe below (see Fig 1a for an illustration) the procedure when a 
shape was presented and its identity was to be reported; the procedure is similar 
when an identity was presented and the corresponding shape was to be reported 
– the respective stimuli are flipped. 500 ms after a fixation mark was centrally 
presented, one of the three shapes appeared above the fixation mark (~3.5 deg 
eccentricity on the vertical meridian) and the three identity words were 
presented in a row as response options below the fixation mark (~3.5 deg, in 
random order). Participants were asked to click on the identity that matched the 
presented shape. Trials were terminated either when a response was made or 
when 1500 ms had passed from stimulus onset, whichever was earlier, in order 
to encourage rapid responses, and hence to improve memory strength. 
Subsequently, the correct response option was highlighted and auditory 
feedback was provided indicating if the response was correct, too slow or wrong. 
Participants performed the shape-identity matching task until performance 
(accuracy) was error-free for each association (no error or time out for 3 
consecutive blocks, with training being mandatory for a minimum of 6 blocks).  
(3) Shape-label-identity learning procedure: This procedure was exactly the same as 
the shape-identity learning procedure described above (#2) except that the line 
drawings of shapes were replaced by their label words (for example, the word 
‘circle’ instead of an actual circle). Thus, any effects on self-prioritization in this 
group of participants cannot be attributed to any sort of perceptual or stimulus-
response learning/associations (since testing on the match-non-match task 
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involves shapes and not shape-labels; see below). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of these three learning conditions. 
Match non-match judgement task 
This task (Fig. 1b) was an exact replication of Sui et al. (2012). A fixation mark was 
presented centrally. 500 ms after trial onset one of the symbols was presented 
approximately 3.5 degrees (centre-to-fixation distance) above the fixation mark along 
the vertical meridian and 
one of the identity words 
was presented below the 
fixation mark (~3.5 deg 
centre to fixation) along the 
vertical meridian. Stimuli 
were presented for 100 ms 
followed by a blank screen, 
which lasted until response 
or for 1100 ms, whichever 
was earlier. Participants 
were asked to report as 
quickly and accurately as 
possible, if the displayed 
shape-identity pairs 
matched one of the learned 
associations (match trial) or if 
they did not match any of the learned associations (non-match trial). Response was 
given by pressing one of two keys with the two index fingers respectively. The 
assignment of the keys (match or non-match) was counterbalanced between 
participants. Auditory feedback was provided after each trial. Trials with response times 
shorter than 200 ms (anticipatory responses) and trials where no response was made 
before it was terminated were reinserted at random locations among the remaining 
sequence of trials. The participant’s behavioural performance in the form of average 
accuracy was displayed on screen after each block. 
Figure 1: Sequence of a trial for a) the shape identity learning 
procedure and b) the match non-match task. 
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The session started with 12 practice trials allowing the participant to become 
familiar with the task, followed by 9 blocks of 60 trials each. Match and non-match trials 
appeared equally often per condition (self-match, self-non-match, friend-match, friend-
non-match, stranger-match and stranger-non-match).  
For participants in one of the extended learning conditions (the shape-identity 
and shape-label-identity learning groups) match-non-match judgement blocks were 
interleaved with further learning blocks. These top-up learning blocks were presented 
to counteract possible memory decay for the different shape-identity associations and 
to ensure that the memory associations for each identity were equally strong (in terms 
of accuracy). Top-up learning blocks had the same structure as the learning blocks 
presented at the beginning. Blocks were repeated until performance was error-free (no 
error or time out) for 3 consecutive blocks. 
Results 
In experiment 1, participants formed 3 
shape-identity-associations in one of three 
learning conditions before performing the 
match-non-match task: 1) the standard 
learning condition (replication of Sui et al., 
2012), 2) shape-identity learning, or 3) 
shape-label-identity learning. Figure 2 
shows the median number of learning 
blocks participants completed before 
reaching error-free performance in learning 
conditions 2 and 3 over the course of the 
experiment. Block ‘0’ refers to training 
before the first match-non-match task 
block. Overall, participants needed several 
blocks of training before they could 
accurately remember and report the identity of a shape (and vice versa). During the 
initial training period, participants needed a median of 30 blocks (~180 trials) in the 
shape-label-identity condition and 18 blocks (~108 trials) in the shape-identity condition 
Figure 2: Median number of training blocks needed 
to reach error-free performance for both extended 
learning conditions (green dashed line: shape-
identity learning; blue dashed-dotted line: shape-
label-identity learning) compared to the minimum 
number of blocks (black solid line). Shaded areas 
show the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
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before they could accurately report all three identity-shape associations. That is, 
auditory presentation of assigned associations was not sufficient for ensuring that 
memory strength was equal across the three associations (as implicitly assumed in 
previous studies), especially under time-limited conditions like those used in the match-
non-match task. Thereafter, top-up training blocks were reasonably close to the 
minimum number of blocks that we imposed for continuing onto the match-non-match 
task. These findings emphasise the need for caution regarding the implicit assumptions 
made about memory requirements in such tasks. 
We tested the effect of the different learning conditions on the self-prioritisation 
effects by analysing accuracy and reaction times (RT) in the match-non-match task. Trials 
with RTs shorter then 200ms were excluded from the analysis, eliminating less than 1% 
of the trials. Median reaction times for each condition and participant were then 
submitted for analysis. d’ values were calculated for each of the three associations (you, 
friend and stranger) to assess accuracy. Following Sui et al. (2012), a trial where a 
matched association (say, circle = you) was correctly recognised as a matched pair was 
called a hit. A trial was considered a false alarm for the same association when the shape 
(here, circle) was presented with a different label (say, friend) and was reported as a 
match. Figure 3 shows the RT and d’ for each of the three learning conditions. 
Figure 3: Median reaction times (left y-axis) and mean d’ (right y-axis) for experiment 1 for each of the 
three learning conditions (black solid line: standard; green dashed line: shape-identity; blue dashed-
dotted line: shape-label-identity learning). Panel (a) shows violin plots (n=24) of reaction times for the 
match trials, panel (b) plots RT for the non-match trials, and panel (c) shows mean d’ across participants. 
Shaded areas are ± 1 SEM (between subjects, to allow comparison across the learning conditions, which 
were tested in separate participants). Error bars show ± 1 SEML&M (within subjects, to allow comparison 
within a learning condition across the three associations, which were tested on the same participants). 
Performance (both RT and d’) was better for self-associations than friend or stranger associations. This 
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was found in all three training conditions. Further, overall performance was better in the two extended 
learning conditions, relative to the standard condition. 
We conducted a two way (3 by 3) mixed design ANOVA with shape-label 
association (self, friend and stranger) as the within-subjects factor and learning 
condition (standard learning, shape-identity learning, and shape-label-identity learning 
procedures) as the between-subjects factor, with d’ values as the dependent variable. 
We found that learning conditions modulated performance (𝐹𝐹(2,69) =  12.73,
𝑝𝑝 <  . 001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .270) and so did the type of shape-label association (𝐹𝐹(1.62,112) =  24.03, 𝑝𝑝 <  . 001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .258). d’ was higher in both extended learning 
conditions compared to the original learning condition, respectively (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 <  . 001). 
However, there was no difference between the two extended procedures (𝑝𝑝 = .607). 
d’ was higher for self-association than for other associations (𝑡𝑡(71) = 5.01,𝑝𝑝 <.0001,𝑑𝑑 = .591; 𝑡𝑡(71) = 5.84, 𝑝𝑝 <  . 0001, 𝑑𝑑 =  . 688); however, there was no 
difference between the latter (𝑡𝑡(71) = .074, 𝑝𝑝 =  . 941,𝑑𝑑 = .009). An interaction 
between learning condition and shape-label association was not observed (𝐹𝐹(3.24,112) =1.41, 𝑝𝑝 = .242, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .039).  
We investigated the effect of self-prioritisation further with planned pairwise 
comparisons between pairs of the three shape-label associations, for each learning 
condition. In all learning conditions, d’ was higher for self-association compared to the 
other-associations (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < .050); although, the difference between self- and friend 
associations was only marginally significant  (𝑝𝑝 = .065) in the shape-label-identity 
condition. There was no difference between the other associations (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 > .851). Results 
of all pairwise comparisons are displayed in table 1. 
Table 1: Pairwise comparisons between d' values for shape-identity associations. Significant differences 
are indicated in bold. Bonferroni-Holm correction was used to correct for multiple comparisons. 
Association Learning condition t(23) p Cohen’s d 
You - friend 
standard 3.274 .023 .668 
shape-identity  3.115 .024 .636 
shape-label-identity 2.594 .065 .529 
You - Stranger  
standard  3.685 .011 .752 
shape-identity 3.566 .013 .728 
shape-label-identity 3.235 .022 .660 
Friend – Stranger 
standard -0.190 .851 .039 
shape-identity 0.519 > .999 .104 
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shape-label-identity -0.219 > .999 .045 
 
Median RT data was analysed using a 3 by 2 by 3 mixed-design ANOVA with 
shape-label association (self, friend, stranger) and trial type (match and non-match) as 
the within subject factors and the learning method (standard learning, shape-identity 
learning, and shape-label-identity learning procedures) as the between subject factor. 
Main effects were observed for association-type (𝐹𝐹(2,138) = 64.8, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001,
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
2 =  . 484), trial-type (𝐹𝐹(1,69) = 306, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .816) and learning condition (𝐹𝐹(2,69) = 7.85, 𝑝𝑝 = .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .185). Median reaction times were lower for the self-
association than for the other associations (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < .0001), with no difference between 
the other (friend vs stranger) associations (𝑝𝑝 = .535). Further, RTs were lower for the 
match-trials, than for the non-match trials. RTs were also higher for the standard 
learning procedure compared to both extended learning procedures (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 <  . 010), with 
no difference between the latter (𝑝𝑝 =  . 756). Only the interaction between 
association- and trial-type yielded a significant result (𝐹𝐹(2,138) = 22.3, 𝑝𝑝 <  . 0001,
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
2 = .244). No other interactions [three-way interaction (𝐹𝐹(4,138) = .222, 𝑝𝑝 = .926,
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
2 = .006), two-way interactions between association-type and learning 
condition (𝐹𝐹(4,138) = 1.88, 𝑝𝑝 = .117, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .052) and trial-type and learning 
condition (𝐹𝐹(2,138) = .534, 𝑝𝑝 = .589, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .015) were observed.  
To analyse the two-way interaction between association-type and trial-type 
further, planned pairwise comparisons were conducted between pairs of the three 
identities for the two trial-types (match, non-match) separately, in each of the three 
learning conditions. All results are summarised in table 2 and are corrected for multiple 
comparisons using the Bonferroni-Holm method. In all learning conditions, RTs in the 
match-trials were faster for the self-association than for the other associations (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 <  0.01). Differences were less consistent in the non-match trials; self-association 
RTs were faster than those for the friend-association in the standard and shape-identity 
learning conditions (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < 0.05); responses were faster for self-association than for 
stranger-association in the shape-identity and the shape-label-identity learning 
conditions (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < 0.05). No difference was noticeable between friend and stranger 
associations in any of the learning conditions (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠  >  0.116). 
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We will discuss the implications of these results after presenting the details and 
results of experiment 2, as the results of the two experiments inform each other. 
Table 2: Planned pairwise comparisons for the reaction time data of experiment 1. Significant 
differences are indicated in bold.  
Trial-type Association Learning condition t(23) p Cohen’s d 
match 
You - 
friend 
standard -5.876 < .001 1.199 
shape-identity  -6.297 < .001 1.285 
shape-label-identity -3.870 .009 0.790 
You -  
Stranger  
standard -3.947 .008 0.806 
shape-identity  -7.187 < .001 1.467 
shape-label-identity -7.937 < .001 1.620 
Friend –  
Stranger 
standard 0.199 .844 0.041 
shape-identity  -0.679 > .999 0.139 
shape-label-identity -2.103 .233 0.429 
non-match 
You -  
friend 
standard -3.589 .015 0.733 
shape-identity  -4.789 .001 0.978 
shape-label-identity -2.236 .212 0.456 
You -  
Stranger  
standard -2.643 .116 0.539 
shape-identity  -4.046 .007 0.826 
shape-label-identity -3.534 .016 0.721 
Friend –  
Stranger 
standard 0.885 > .999 0.181 
shape-identity  2.019 .221 0.412 
shape-label-identity -2.442 .159 0.498 
Methods: Experiment 2 
In the second experiment, we approached the question of whether memory-based 
differences could explain the observed self-related effects from a different angle. Here, 
we tested the hypothesis that differences in the stability of memories for shape-label 
(e.g. identity) associations can produce the performance patterns reported by Sui et al. 
(2012). That is, we tested if the observed behavioural patterns can be reproduced if 
memory differences were intentionally introduced, even in the absence of any self-
related associations. 
Participants 
24 participants (19 female, 22.3 ± 4.7 years) were recruited from the student population 
of the University of Aberdeen and received either course credits (year 1 and 2 
Psychology undergraduate students) or monetary reimbursement of £5 (all other 
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students) for their time. Students that had been asked to form associations between 
labels and shapes in previous experiments were excluded from the study. Participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision. Written informed consent was obtained. The 
study has been approved by the ethics committee of the University of Aberdeen. 
Material and Stimuli 
The material and stimuli were the same as in experiment 1 with one exception. Instead 
of the identity words ‘you’, ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’, three meaningless non-words ‘fline’, 
‘gyple’ and ‘umry’ were used. These words were chosen from a list of non-words 
supplied by a language expert at the department (Dr Alexandra Cleland, by personal 
communication). We then tested if the words had any meaning in English or other 
languages, including slang, by checking against google translate 
(http://translate.google.com) and the urban dictionary 
(http://www.urbandictionary.com). We selected three words that did not have any 
meaning. 
Procedure 
The procedure for experiment 2 was the same as that of the second (shape-identity 
extended learning) condition in experiment 1, apart from two changes. First, instead of 
associating identities with shapes, participants learnt to associate non-words with 
shapes and second, memory differences between the newly associated shape-non-word 
pairs were introduced intentionally. 
First, participants were presented with (counterbalanced) associations between 
geometric shapes and the non-words. For example, a participant was told: “Flyne is a 
triangle, umry is a square and gyple is a circle”. The verbal instruction was then followed 
by a shape-non-word training task, which was designed to consolidate the three 
associations to varying degrees. As in experiment 1, in half of the trials a shape was 
presented above the fixation mark and the three non-words were presented below the 
fixation mark as response options. In the other half of the trials one of the non-words 
was presented above the fixation mark and the shapes were shown as response options. 
Participants were presented with 104 training trials split over 4 blocks. Memory 
differences were introduced by manipulating the exposure to the three shape-non-word 
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pairs: 8 (low exposure), 24 (medium exposure) or 72 (high exposure) times respectively. 
The timing sequence of the trials during the learning part and the procedure of the 
match-non-match task were identical to experiment 1.  
Results 
In the second experiment, participants 
formed associations of varying strengths 
between geometric shapes and non-
words. Participants were then tested on a 
match-non-match task to determine if the 
same pattern of results as observed in 
experiment 1 would also be observed 
here, in the absence of any reference to 
the self. 
Figure 4 shows the accuracy of 
reporting the appropriate shape/non-
word for a given non-word/shape for the different frequencies of exposure, during the 
training procedure. Performance was much higher, unsurprisingly, for shape-non-word 
association with the highest exposure, suggesting that the manipulation of memory 
strength was successful. Note that the participants had been verbally informed about 
the appropriate association before undergoing this training session. 
We then analysed performance in the match-non-match tasks. As in experiment 
1, trials with reaction times of less than 200ms were excluded from the analysis. 
Excluded trials amounted to less than 1%.  
A one-way (3 levels) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to investigate 
the influence of exposure (low, medium and high) on the accuracy of reporting (𝑑𝑑’). A 
main effect of exposure was found (𝐹𝐹(2,46) = 9.07  𝑝𝑝 < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .283). Planned 
pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni-Holm corrected) revealed higher accuracy for the 
associations that were practiced for 72 trials compared to those practiced for 24 (𝑡𝑡(23) =  2.61,𝑝𝑝 = .032, 𝑑𝑑 = 0.532) and 8 trials (𝑡𝑡(23) = 4.27, 𝑝𝑝 < .001,𝑑𝑑 = 0.871), 
Figure 4: Box plots of accuracy (n=24) for each 
exposure condition, during the learning part. 
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respectively. However, low and medium exposure conditions did not differ in accuracy. (𝑡𝑡(23) = 1.49,𝑝𝑝 = .151, 𝑑𝑑 = .303).  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on median RT data, with 
exposure (low, medium, high) and trial-type (match, non-match) as within-subject 
factors. Both exposure (𝐹𝐹(2,46) = 16.0, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 =  . 410) and trial-type (𝐹𝐹(1,23) = 103, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .818) affected performance. An interaction between 
exposure and trial-type (𝐹𝐹(2,46) = 15.3  𝑝𝑝 < .0001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 =  . 399) was also observed. 
Overall, RTs were faster for associations that were practised for 72 trials compared to 
those practised for 24 and 8 trials (𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 < .001), respectively. No difference in RTs were 
found between associations practiced for 24 and 8 trials (𝑝𝑝 = .737). RTs were lower for 
match- than for non-match trials (𝑝𝑝 < .0001). Planned pair-wise comparisons revealed 
that exposure influenced RTs only for the match trials. Results for all pairwise 
comparisons can be seen in table 3. RT and d’ for each exposure condition are plotted 
in figure 5. Data from the standard condition of experiment 1 is plotted alongside for 
reference. The response pattern (shorter RTs and higher d’ for the self-related/high-
exposure association compared to the other associations) is the same in both 
conditions. However, the performance in the exposure condition appears to be slightly 
better. This might be attributable to the training on associations in this, but not in the 
standard learning condition. 
  
Figure 5: Median reaction times and mean d’ data for experiment 2 as a function of exposure during 
learning (red dotted line). The standard condition of experiment 1 (black solid line) is shown for 
reference). Note that all pairs in experiment 2 were presented equally often during the match-non-match 
task. Panel (a) shows violin plots (n=24) of reaction times in the match trials; panel (b) depicts violin plots 
of the reaction times in the non-match trials, and panel (c) plots the d’ data. Error bars are ± 1 SEML&M 
(within-subjects). 
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Table 3: Planned pairwise comparisons for the reaction time data of experiment 2. Significant 
differences are indicated in bold. P-values are Bonferroni-Holm corrected. 
Trial type Exposures t(23) p Cohen’s d 
Match 72 – 24 -6.09 < .0001 1.24 
72 – 8 -6.08 < .0001 1.24 
24 – 8 -.717 .973 .144 
Non-match 72 – 24 -1.63 .464 .334 
72 – 8 -1.22 .707 .249 
24 – 8 0.57 .576 .116 
Post hoc analysis 
We had also planned to fit a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) (Wiecki, Sofer, & 
Frank, 2013) to the data of both experiments to be able to test if the behavioural 
differences observed in the above experiments were based on perceptual or non-
perceptual differences, and if those differences would be affected by extended learning 
conditions. Although we did make sure that a high enough number of trials was 
submitted to the model overall (e.g. by repeating timed out trials), the models with the 
best fits did not converge for one or more of the learning conditions. Hence, we are not 
able to draw conclusions from these models1. However, we can tentatively conclude 
from these models (please see supplementary materials) that, in the standard learning 
condition (replication of Sui et al., 2012), self-associations are more biased towards 
‘match’ responses, need less evidence for response and have faster evidence 
accumulation for decision making than other-associations, suggesting that both 
perceptual and non-perceptual processes are modulated by relating objects to the self. 
Given that there is tentative evidence for differences in bias (which likely reflects 
a non-perceptual parameter, at least in paradigms such as the current one) across the 
different types of associations, according to the above model and some previous studies 
(e.g., Sui et al. 2012), we analysed (not planned in our pre-submission) the influence of 
learning and association on bias (or the response criterion c) using signal detection 
theory. That is, we tested if self-prioritisation shifts the internal criterion, if this criterion 
is modulated by learning, and if differences in exposure to non-social stimuli lead to a 
similar pattern in bias as for social stimuli. The response criteria for all shape-label pairs 
and learning conditions are shown in table 4.  
                                                 
1 A description of the planned approaches and the performed analyses are presented in the 
supplementary material. 
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One-sample t-tests were applied to assess the existence of biases for the 
different associations in the standard learning condition and independent samples t-
tests were used to compare the criteria for the other learning conditions (shape-
identity-, shape-label-identity- and shape-non-word learning) with the standard learning 
condition.  
The response criterion for the self-related association did not differ between the 
standard learning condition and both extended learning conditions �𝑡𝑡(33.3) = 1.23,
𝑝𝑝 =  . 229,𝑑𝑑 = .354; 𝑡𝑡(35.1) = .894,𝑝𝑝 = .229,𝑑𝑑 = .038; �. Overall, no bias was 
observed for the self-related association (𝑐𝑐 = -. 004 ±  . 24; 𝑡𝑡(71) =  -. 131,
𝑝𝑝 =  . 896,𝑑𝑑 = .015). For the friend-related association participants were conservative 
in the standard learning condition �𝑐𝑐 = .301 ± .40; 𝑡𝑡(23) = 3.67,𝑝𝑝 = .001,𝑑𝑑 = 4.90�. 
For both extended learning conditions this bias was significantly reduced (𝑡𝑡(27.8) =  2.77,𝑝𝑝 =  . 010,𝑑𝑑 =  . 800; 𝑡𝑡(46) = 2.32,𝑝𝑝 = .025;𝑑𝑑 = .669). For the 
stranger-related association, again a bias was found for the standard learning 
condition �𝑐𝑐 = .298 ± .25; 𝑡𝑡(23) = 5.75,𝑝𝑝 < .001,𝑑𝑑 = 1.17�, and was again reduced 
for the shape-identity learning condition (𝑡𝑡(46) = 2.19, 𝑝𝑝 = .034, 𝑑𝑑 = .632) and 
marginally reduced for the shape-label-identity condition (𝑡𝑡(46) = 1.83,𝑝𝑝 = .074,𝑑𝑑 =.528). 
We then compared bias in standard self-association with bias in the high 
exposure condition of experiment 2. We found no differences between them. There 
were no differences for the two other-associations as well (𝑡𝑡(37.9) = 1.69,𝑝𝑝 =0.099,𝑑𝑑 = .489; 𝑡𝑡(37.3) = 1.91,𝑝𝑝 = .241,𝑑𝑑 = .344; 𝑡𝑡(46) = 1.15,𝑝𝑝 = .257,𝑑𝑑 = .331). 
These findings suggest that there is no response bias for self-associations, in any 
of the learning conditions, or for the high exposure condition. However, responses are 
conservative in the standard friend/medium exposure conditions and in the standard 
stranger/low exposure conditions. Thus, the response patterns and criteria are 
comparable between typical self-prioritisation experiments and when memory 
differences are artificially introduced. However, these biases are eliminated when 
participants undergo extensive training aimed at equating memory differences across 
association types. 
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Table 4: Response criteria for each of the learning conditions and identities/exposure. Positive scores 
indicate a conservative response criterion and negative scores a liberal response criterion. The closer to 
zero the value is, the more balanced is the response criterion. The numbers in parentheses are standard 
deviations.  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = −0.5 ∗ (𝑍𝑍[𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡] + 𝑍𝑍[𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶])  
Learning condition you/high exposure friend/medium exposure stranger/low exposure 
standard .03 (.34) .30 (.40) .30 (.25) 
Shape-identity -.06 (.16) .06 (.13) .14 (.23) 
Shape-label-identity .02 (.18) .08 (.23) .17 (.22) 
Shape-non-word -.11 (.21) .19 (.24) .21 (.27) 
Discussion 
It has been well established that effects of self-prioritisation facilitate memory 
acquisition (e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Rogers et al., 1977; 
Turk et al., 2008). In two experiments, we tested if effects of self-prioritisation that have 
been ascribed to differences in perception (e.g. salience) between self-related and non-
self-related stimuli are instead due to underlying differences in memory. We 
approached this question from two sides. We tested if deliberately introduced 
differences in memory would lead to response patterns that resemble those based on 
self-prioritisation. We found that this was indeed the case; newly introduced memory 
differences in novel stimuli lead to self-prioritisation-like effects, even in the absence of 
any association with the self. Second, we tested if extended learning, which was aimed 
at overcoming possible memory differences between self- and other- related stimuli, 
would eliminate effects of self-prioritisation in the perceptual domain. Here, we found 
that extensive training did not eliminate self-prioritisation effects. 
Perception or memory? 
In the standard learning condition, where participants were only verbally 
informed about the associations between simple geometric shapes and identities, we 
found better performance for the self-shape association than for friend- or stranger-
shape associations. This replicates the findings of Sui et al. (2012). However, this could 
have been due to differences in the stability of the associations between self and a 
shape- and others and corresponding shapes. Indeed, modulating exposure and thereby 
memory for different shape-non-word pairs in experiment 2 resulted in better 
performance (higher d’ and faster RTs) for the pair that was most often presented 
(72 times) during the learning part, than for the pairs that were presented less 
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frequently (24 or 8 times). In this experiment, there was no reference to the self. In fact, 
all stimuli were novel and had no social significance. Further, the internal criterion used 
for decision making, or bias, varied in the same way for the different association-types 
in the two experiments. These results suggest that memory differences could lead to 
the documented pattern of behaviour. It is possible that such memory differences are 
introduced when associations between geometric shapes and different identities are 
formed. 
However, if memory differences play a role, one might have expected that 
extensive practice with the different shape-label pairs would have eliminated or at least 
reduced differences in performance. Although we found that overall performance 
(d’ and RT) improved in the two extended learning procedures (shape-identity and 
shape-label-identity learning), differences among the different shape-identity 
associations remained. On one hand, this could be interpreted as evidence that memory 
differences among association pairs does not explain the self-prioritisation effects. That 
is, the observed effects of self-prioritisation are not due to memory differences but in 
fact manifest in the perceptual domain. On the other hand, it might be the case that the 
learning procedures that we applied were unable to overcome the strong and persistent 
influence that self has on memory. The extent of training we used (averaging about 250 
trials in half an hour) might not be sufficient to overcome the life-long preference for 
self-related information for memory consolidation. Another reason could be that, in our 
learning procedure, participants were exposed to all shape-label pairs equally often 
during the learning part. That is, not only were the participants trained on the other-
related pairs, but also had similar exposure to the self-related pair. Our criterion for 
allowing participants to be tested on the match-non-match task was achieving error-
free performance in the training task for at least 3 blocks. It could be that participants 
achieved ceiling performance for all three associations, but the strengths of memory 
associations might still have been different, given equal exposure to all pairs. This could 
be why we observed an overall increase in d’ rather than a convergence of d’ values 
between the different shape-identity pairs. Hence, we cannot conclude that memory 
has an influence, but we cannot exclude it either. 
Another possibility for why the self-related effect was not eliminated by 
extended training might have to do with concreteness of the used labels. In a recent 
study examining the self-prioritisation effect, Wade and Vickery (2017) found that labels 
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that referred to concrete items such as ‘Snake’, ‘Frog’ or ‘Greg’2 produced prioritisation 
effects comparable to that of ‘Self’. However, non-concrete labels such as ‘Friend’ or 
‘Stranger’ did not do so, even when they were imbued with threat associations. Based 
on this, it was suggested that the labels used as controls in typical self-prioritisation 
studies (e.g. friend, stranger or other), are not concrete and hence do not produce any 
prioritisation effects, whereas ‘Self’ is concrete, and hence leads to a benefit. Our 
extended learning technique does not introduce any concrete associations for the 
control labels. This might be why the self-related benefit persisted despite training. In 
other words, the results of the first experiment might not suggest that self-prioritisation 
effects are perceptual in nature, but reflect the continued concreteness of the ‘self’ 
label, which is not shared by the control labels. Of course, the effect of concreteness 
might be mediated through perceptual processes (e.g., through visual mental imagery; 
Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006), or semantic processes (Binder, Westbury, 
McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Kounios & Holcomb, 1994). However, these 
processes are not self-related and apply to all objects. Further, it is known that 
concreteness also affects memory encoding and retrieval, with concrete objects more 
likely to be remembered and recalled (Fliessbach, Weis, Klaver, Elger, & Weber, 2006). 
This concreteness benefit is also observed for novel associations between pairs of 
stimuli (Paivio, Walsh, & Bons, 1994). 
Although extended learning did not reduce the differences in performance 
among the different shape-identity associations, post-hoc analysis of participants’ 
internal criteria3 revealed that learning does modulate processing of stimuli that has 
implications for our hypothesis. In the standard learning condition, we found that 
participants’ criterion was unbiased only for the self-related association. For the other 
related-associations the response criteria were substantially conservative. However, 
extended learning reduced this bias.  
In the second experiment, where memory stability was directly manipulated by 
differences in exposure to shape-non-word pairs, we found a pattern of the internal 
criterion reminiscent of the standard self-prioritisation effect. There was no bias in the 
                                                 
2 For the participants ‘Greg’ was the name of the experimenter, who ran the study. 
3 Note that this analysis was performed as the planned analysis of perceptual and non-perceptual 
effects based on parameter estimation using hierarchical drift diffusion modelling (HDDM) was not 
successful. For a description of the planned analysis using HDDM see the supplementary material. 
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high exposure condition, but participants were more conservative in the medium and 
low exposure conditions. Further, the pattern of results was comparable in the 
standard-learning and the memory manipulation conditions. This provides further 
evidence that the basis of self-prioritisation might lie in memory differences. 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that self-prioritisation leads to perceptual changes. 
Further evidence against perceptual influences of self-prioritisation comes from 
a recent study that investigated the influences of self-prioritisation on detection 
thresholds for shapes presented under continuous flash suppression (Macrae, 
Visokomogilski, Golubickis, Cunningham, & Sahraie, 2017) (Stein, Siebold and van Zoest, 
2016). The association procedure in Macrae et al. (in press) study was similar to the 
original procedure used by Sui et al. (2012) and our standard-learning condition. In this 
study, perceptual and non-perceptual influences for the three identity-shape 
associations were estimated using hierarchical drift diffusion modelling. Only non-
perceptual parameters were found to differ between identities (you, friend and 
stranger). As in our study, a difference in bias between the self-related and the other-
related associations was observed. Similarly, Stein et al. (2016) did not find a difference 
in breakthrough CFS duration (a measure of the extent of suppression during CFS) for 
self and other associations, indicating that the self-related benefit arises at a later stage 
of processing and not at the perceptual level. 
We also found shorter reaction times in the match trials for the self-related 
shape-identity pair compared to the friend- or stranger related pair, replicating the 
findings of Sui et al. (2012). However, we did not observe a distinction between the 
friend- and the stranger related shape-identity associations. The distinction between a 
familiar other and a non-familiar other seems not as robust as the difference between 
the self and others and is not consistently observed (Golubickis et al., in press). As with 
the accuracy results, extended learning led to an overall improvement in reaction times, 
but there was no reduction in the differences between self- and other related shape-
identity pairs. Reaction times for the shape-identity and shape-label-identity learning 
procedures were shorter than for the standard learning procedure. No differences were 
observed between the two extended learning procedures.  
Perceptual learning 
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Interestingly, the improvement in performance observed in the learning 
conditions cannot be attributed to perceptual learning. In the third (shape-label-
identity) learning condition, we did not use any shapes; instead, we used shape words 
(such as the word ‘circle’). The participants, however, were tested with shapes in the 
match-non-match task. The pattern of results in this condition was the same as in the 
condition where participants were trained with shapes. This suggests that the benefits 
of learning (overall increase in d’ and reduction in RT) were not due to increased 
exposure to shapes.  
Artificially introduced memory differences (experiment 2) led to a pattern of 
performance similar to that in the established self-prioritisation effect (higher d’ and 
faster RT for self-related objects). Here, responses were faster to the shape-non-word 
pair that was practiced most frequently during the learning part and slower for the less 
frequently practiced pairs. However, one potential confounding factor in experiment 2 
is perceptual learning. That is, the difference in exposure might not only have influenced 
the consolidation of memory, but also low-level perceptual processing. However, we do 
not think that this was the case. In the training session, the response options for a given 
target non-word included all shapes (or non-words, when the target object was a shape). 
Hence, the difference in perceptual exposure to the individual shapes and non-words in 
the three exposure conditions (low, medium and high) was actually much lower than 
what the names might suggest. The shapes and non-words were presented 56, 64, and 
88 times, respectively, in the low, medium and high exposure conditions. However, note 
that the association was trained 8, 24, and 72 times respectively. Further, much 
perceptual learning is location specific and reduced when different stimuli are presented 
at the same location (see Watanabe & Sasaki, 2015 for a recent review on visual 
perceptual learning). During learning, the shapes and non-words used for the responses 
were never presented at the same location. Further, all target objects were presented 
in the same location, making it unlikely that perceptual learning occurred. We believe 
that our learning procedure successfully manipulated memory as intended. The results 
of this experiment, therefore, show that memory differences can be one source for the 
pattern of results observed in typical self-prioritisation tasks.  
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Conclusion 
Although extended learning improved overall performance, we found that differences 
between self-related and non-self-related shape-label associations remained. This could 
either indicate that memory has no influence on self-prioritisation effects, which are 
mediated via perceptual differences, or that self-related memory is too powerful to be 
easily eliminated (at least with our procedure). Alternatively, it could reflect the 
concreteness of the labels used, which is not altered by extended training. However, we 
observed that memory differences for non-words can be quickly established and can 
reproduce response patterns closely resembling typical self-prioritisation effects. We 
conclude that the same pattern of behavioural results can be established through a 
number of routes, which might include perceptual effects, differences in memory 
strengths, and reward incentive structures (de Greck et al., 2008; Northoff & Hayes, 
2011; Sui et al., 2012). It can be argued that in paradigms that do not directly measure 
perceptual changes, but instead rely on reaction times as a measure, differences cannot 
be exclusively attributed to changes in perception, but are just as likely based on 
differences in memory. 
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